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CHAPTER I 
OVERVIEW 
Introduction
In a market economy all goods from diamonds to ferti­
lizer are subject to transient schedules of supply and de­
mand. These schedules vary with time, the relative scarcity 
of the goods, and the preferences of the present owners and 
of potential purchasers. The same factors apply to workers 
who own their personal labor and sell it to the highest bid­
der.
Just as there are transaction costs such as shipping, 
insurance, and brokerage fees involved in the market for ma­
terial goods which may make a superficially attractive price 
infeasible, so there are transaction costs in the employment 
market such as vested retirement, moving costs, and psychic 
costs to the worker, which may make him refuse a better job 
or even remain unemployed when a job which would otherwise 
be satisfactory is open.
The Classical Market
In the perfectly efficient market of the classical 
economists, both buyers and sellers are atomistic, (i.e., 
they are such a Small portion of the overall market that 
they can not influence the going price for a given item by 
their actions). They also are perfectly informed and have 
no transaction costs; the current supply and demand sched-
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
ules are well known to all participants in the market by 
virtue of the price at which transactions occur. Since 
there are no transaction costs to differentiate between par­
ticipants in the market, the lowest price which will just 
clear the market will always prevail.
The Real Markets
In most real markets from steel to toothpaste these 
idealistic conditions do not exist and the market is not 
efficient— big buyers get discounts, credit standing and lo­
cation affect cost of sales. Goods which are physically a- 
like may command different prices because of advertising in­
duced brand preferences, tied sales, or non-tangible factors 
such as delivery schedules. Even when such influences are 
quantified and added to the pricing, some market irrational­
ity is observed because no market participant is fully aware 
of all the other participants' intentions.
These same problems exist in the labor market. The 
shantytowns of Appalachia testify to the power of big pur­
chasers in the labor market, unions effectively differenti­
ate products which are otherwise identical, and employers 
tend to hire from convenient locales while workers seek work 
which will permit them to remain in the same area. Even the 
most casual observer will admit that the employment market 
is not efficient in the sense of the classical economist, 
however it may be efficient in another sense— that of the 
securities market.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Efficiency in the Stock Market^
Theorists who study the securities markets have hy­
pothesized that there are degrees of efficiency with respect 
to the amount of information that market participants pos­
sess. These levels of information are differentiated as the 
strong, semi-strong, and weak efficient market hypotheses. 
The Information Levels
The strong hypothesis holds if there is no trading 
advantage in the stock market to insiders. This includes 
corporate employees and may include analysts and specialists 
who are aware of developments in a firm through conversa­
tions with its employees or by studying data which is not 
available or is prohibitively expensive to the general pub­
lic. The semi-strong holds if no advantage can be obtained 
by studying all available public information such as annual 
reports. Security Exchange Commission reports, industry news 
and news releases. Lastly, the weak hypothesis holds if no 
advantage can accrue from studying past price performance of 
the stocks and capitalizing on trends in the price.
Tests of the Strong Hypothesis
In the stock market efficiency is easy to measure, 
one simply observes the class being studied to see if they 
are making any more money by market transactions than an in-
A thorough discussion of the concept and consequen­
ces of an efficient market can be found in chapters four and 
five of: James H. Lorie and Mary T. Hamilton, The Stock
Market: Theories and Evidence (Homewood, Illinois: Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1973).
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vestor with a lower level of information would. Empirical 
tests indicate that the stock market is inefficient at the 
strong level, in fact there are Securities Exchange Commis­
sion rules prohibiting the use of inside information by in­
siders or brokers to insure that an advantage will not ac­
crue to them. The periodic indictments under those rules 
would indicate that inefficiency does indeed exist at the 
strong level. Studies of mutual fund performance indicates 
that inefficiencies tend to be one time phenomena as no mu­
tual fund has consistently outperformed a random selection
2of similar stocks.
Tests of the Semi-strong Hypothesis
On the semi-strong level the evidence and feelings 
are mixed. Several studies of the price reaction to releas­
es of information pertaining to the firm indicate an effi­
cient market.^ However most investors still believe that an 
advantage can be accrued and provide a flourishing market 
for information services.^ It is postulated that the effi­
ciency arises from this constant seeking of an advantage and 
the market would become inefficient if investors ceased to 
seek an advantage.
^Lorie and Hamilton, pp. 92-94.
^Ibid., pp. 83-87.
^Jerome F. Cohen, Edward D. Zinbarg, and Arthur Zei- 
kel. Investment Analysis ^ d  Portfolio Management (Homewood, 
Illinois I Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973)» P* 730.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Tests of the Weak Hypothesis
On the weak level, tests are made by use of filter 
rules which prescribe mechanical means of spotting a trend 
in stock prices and profiting from it. Numerous filters 
have been tested against computerized records of the stock 
market, but none of them have done better than a simple buy 
and hold strategy based on a market index.^ At least, if 
they have, the successful theorist is keeping it a secret.
There is some question as to whether this efficiency 
is because investors are equally well informed atomistic 
elements in the market— as the theory would suggest— or be­
cause the many individuals react in random ways to a wave of 
conflicting information resulting in a random walk of stock 
prices— an equality of uncertainty.^ This concept of de­
grees of efficiency can be carried over to the employment 
market.
Efficiency in the Labor Market
The Strong Hypothesis in the Labor Market
As in the securities market, there is no doubt that 
the employment market is inefficient with respect to insid­
ers. Nepotism, union rules, and company policy to promote 
from within may effectively restrict competition for some 
jobs to insiders. In other cases promotions to certain jobs
^Cohen, Zinbarg, and Zeikel, p. 752. 
^Lorie and Hamilton, p. 80.
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may be based on seniority, department, or possession of some 
skill not required in the job except as an experience pre­
requisite with no "bidding" by possible candidates with low- 
er wage requirements to do the job. Likewise outsiders may 
not be privy to the existence of a job opportunity.
The Semi-strong Hypothesis in the Labor Market
The second level in the employment market is rather 
limited since the only specialists or brokers are those re­
cruiting at the executive level. Neither employment agen­
cies nor company personnel offices are at the semi-strong 
level of efficiency; information possessed by the former is 
available to the general public, hence is at the lowest lev­
el of efficiency, while information known to the latter is 
inside information. The limited executive market may be 
efficient; executive mobility, a pattern of advancement by 
changing firms, and the very existence of executive "head 
hunters" point toward efficiency. However, differences be­
tween industries and firms, and the nebulous quality of ex­
ecutive "style" argue for a non-homogeneous product which 
militates against efficiency. This paper will not test the 
semi-strong level but will be limited to the question; "Is 
the employment market efficient in the weak sense?"
The Weak Hypothesis in the Labor Market
For the labor market the weak level of information is
^Lloyd G. Reynolds, The Structure of Labor Markets 
(New York; Harper and Brothers, 1951), P« 45*
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that level possessed by workers who do not have inside in­
formation on job openings. This includes knowledge of pre­
sent job offers, current and past unemployment, and a gener­
alized knowledge of the state of the local economy. A truly 
efficient labor market would have as a minimum the following 
characteristics; a homogeneous product or an approximation 
of it by a finite number of homogeneous classes of products; 
negligible transaction costs; complete geographic mobility; 
free job information quickly and readily available to all
workers; and a homogeneity of values— that is all workers
5 1 
8
place the same worth on a given package of wages and bene­
fits.
Summary
Having surveyed the question of market efficiency, 
one notes that most markets are not efficient. However, as 
is seen in the securities market, when the conditions of the 
perfect market— atomistic competition, perfect information, 
and homogeneous product— are approached, efficiency becomes 
possible. The next chapter will investigate whether the 
public labor market should be efficient and outline a test 
of its efficiency.
OReynolds, pp. 43-50.
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY, HYPOTHESIS, AND TEST 
Introduction
This chapter will review the literature of employment 
theory with particular attention to those factors which 
would indicate either an efficient or inefficient market.
It will then explain the hypothesis to be tested in explicit 
form with supporting terms defined. Lastly, three specific 
methods which will be used to test for efficiency will be 
outlined with the expected findings which would accompany an 
efficient market.
Related Studies 
No studies which address the question of efficiency 
outside the securities market were found; however a number 
of studies which deal with related topics such as informa­
tion flow, mobility, or other labor market imperfections are 
noted below. It is worth noting that many of the studies 
cited, even the most recent, may be rapidly approaching ob­
solescence because of related technological and sociological 
changes. For example the so-called information explosion 
with a proliferation of computer systems and public televi­
sion has not yet been integrated into the employment infor­
mation system. Likewise, changing ethnic values and the 
move from the extended to the nuclear family will affect mo­
bility and the very attitudes of workers toward work. The
8
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impact of such changes is beyond the scope of this study, 
but one can examine the past as a data base for what will 
occur.
The Theorists
On the theoretical side Pigou statesi "given perfect 
competition and perfect mobility there will always be full 
employment • • , with friction full employment will tend to
9exist"I however as Reynolds points out; ^labor is flawed 
from being perfect because of non-homogeneous product, lack 
of rapid and accurate information dissemination, virtually 
no information on critical non-wage aspects of jobs, no way 
to notify all interested parties simultaneously, inter-em- 
ployer relationships (no labor pirating), geographic mis­
match of employees and employers, and u n i o n s . I r o n i c a l ­
ly, as R.J. Flanagan notes; "The U.S. has the most incom­
plete adjustment of supply and demand in the labor market 
. . . not due to immobility but to mobility . . . with its 
complement of a high separation rate and many new entries as 
workers move in and out of the work f o r c e . T h u s  the the­
ories predicate an inefficient market which tends toward ef­
ficiency as mobility and information access improve.
^A.C. Pigou, Employment and Equilibrium (London; 
MacMillan and Co., 1941),p. 78.
^^Reynolds, p. 44, emphasis was added.
^^R.J. Flanagan, "U.S. Phillip’s Curve and Interna­
tional Unemployment Rate Differentials," The American Eco­
nomic Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March, 1973)» P» 130.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The Surveys
Actual studies also shed some light on the question.
In a study of a northeastern city Reynolds discovered that:
. . . mobility is restricted by; geographical at­
tachments (especially strong where home ownership/ 
ethnic group is involved), employer attachments (se­
curity and seniority related), limited knowledge of 
opportunities, a belief'that good jobs are scarce 
and that the better jobs required "pull" along with 
a healthy risk avoidance motive.12
In another study by D.O. Parsons it was found that:
Perfect information is costly and job transfer costs 
may make even much higher wages unattractive . . . .  
Firms seeking to enhance their selection can do so 
by lowering costs to the seeking worker through 
widespread advertising, recruiters and lower trans­
fer costs— paid moving, mobile seniority, higher wages, etc.13
This emphasis on information which is the lifeblood 
of an efficient market predicts that the employment market 
will probably be inefficient. It also points to another so­
ciological problem; namely those people most likely to be 
unemployed— the aged, women, and minority groups are also 
most likely to be outside the existing information stream 
and least likely to have inside information— thus they will 
tend to remain unemployed or underemployed.
Inefficiency may be structural. In chapter I it was 
acceded as obvious that the employment market was ineffi­
cient with respect to insiders, but one study by the U.S.
12Reynolds, p. 77.
^^D.O. Parsons, "Quit Rates Over Time: A Search and
Information Approach," The American Economic Review, Vol. 
53. No. 3 (June, 1973). PP. 391-393.
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Employment Service indicated that public and private employ­
ment agencies were involved in less than 30^ of all place­
ments and 50 to 6Q% of all new hires had inside information 
about the job o p e n i n g s , T h u s  the efficiency of the public 
market, if it exists at all, may be masked by the ineffi­
ciency of the larger, statistically inseparable insider mar­
ket.
Hypothesis to be Tested 
The hypothesis is: The employment market is effi­
cient in the weak sense. That is the employment market pro­
vides employers and job seekers sufficient information such 
that jobs offered will be filled quickly with well qualified 
persons. Once a job is taken, new job seekers will be aware 
that it is gone and will cease to apply for it. This hy­
pothesis will be tested in six Montana counties which have 
had large changes in employment in recent years and should 
reflect the efficiency of the local market in generating job 
seekers matched to those jobs.
Labor Market Efficiency Defined
The most troublesome definition in this study is that 
of efficiency. In the classical market it is easily recog­
nized; the market is efficient if the price of goods (wages 
in our case) is such that the market is just cleared, i.e., 
no unemployment. Barring the independently wealthy, each
ih,Seymour L. WoIfbein. Employment. Unemployment, and 
Public Policy (New York: Random House, 1965)» P* I65.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
seller is atomistic and must accept the going rate since he 
can not affect the wages offered. This definition fails on 
several countsi first, unemployment benefits, welfare, job 
contracts, and the minimum wage form a downward limit on the 
flexibility of wages; second, the empiricists have shown 
that while wages flex upward with ease there is a low elas­
ticity of wages downward; lastly, frictional unemployment 
and "discouraged" unemployed— those who have been out of 
work so long that they have ceased to look— will always be 
with us to spoil gross unemployment as a measure of effi-
15ciency.
The second definition is that in an efficient market 
each good will bear a price which reflects its true worth 
embodying all that is known about the good. In the securi­
ties market if investor A does not believe in an efficient 
market he will buy Amalgamated Fog Bank (AFB) shares on a 
hot tip that APB just struck oil in Zambia; later he discov­
ers that the market is efficient when the hoped for price 
rise in AFB shares does not materialize since the news about 
an oil strike was already reflected in the shares when they 
were purchased. In fact he may even lose on his investment 
as fellow disbelievers find no profit in holding their 
shares and cause the market price to decline as they sell 
off speculative holdings.
^Paul 0. Flaim, "Discouraged Workers and Unemploy­
ment," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 96, No. 3 (March, 1973). 
p. 8.
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This same concept can be applied to the job market 
except that the inflexibility of wages and the ability of 
employers to alter non-quantified job aspects makes the wage 
paid to a job holder a weak, if at all valid, measure of 
efficiency.Instead we must observe the behavior of the 
job seekers through the levels of employment and unemploy­
ment to test for efficiency.
Test Methodology
Three tests for market efficiency are used in this 
study; two are quantitative and one is qualitative. The 
qualitative one comes from impressions of managers as to 
whether their employees as new hires are well matched to the 
jobs being offered, that is if they are looking for carpen­
ters do they find ironworkers making application for jobs? 
While this is strictly subjective, it gives some measure of 
goodness of fit between jobs offered and sought at a given 
firm which in turn indicates the quality of job information 
in circulation. This measure will vary a good deal with the 
source of the applicants; one might expect declining good­
ness of fit as you go from a union hiring hall, to an em­
ployment agency, to various ads, to job seekers coming in 
off the streets.
The second is a test of the Phillip's curve relation­
ship. Briefly, the Phillip's curve is a downward sloping
1 Albert Rees, "Real Variable in Phillip's Curve is 
Real Wage," Economica. Vol. 37, No. 14? (August, 1970), 
p. 234.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
curve which depicts the relationship between percent unem­
ployment and percent wage increases; while the coefficients 
vary with a variety of factors and the explanations of those 
variances cover a wide range, the fact of a downward slope
and the short run stability of the curve are empirically 
17proven. Unfortunately, wage increases per se were not 
available, however they can be inferred from median income 
data which are available. Since the driving force behind 
the curve is employee and employer information one can de­
duce that the market is highly efficient if the curve shows 
actual wage declines in the face of unemployment or if it is 
sensitive to changes in unemployment; conversely, if the 
curve is substantially flat implying that wage changes are 
relatively independent of unemployment, then the market is 
inefficient with employees getting less than they should in 
good times and more than they should in hard times.
The Phillip's curve data are an aggregated scatter 
diagram of unemployment rates vs. percent change in mean in­
come for five Montana counties studied, see figures 1 and 
182. Data for Pondera county were not plotted because of 
the dominant effect of agriculture, in particular fluctua­
ting wheat prices, on the mean income in that county.
17Ewan Clauge, Unemployment. Past, Present, and Fu­
ture (Washingtonj American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1969), p. 35»
18Data for these figures was derived from Appendixes 
I and II; Figure 1 is for income in current dollars, while 
Figure 2 is for income in constant 196? dollars.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
Lastly employment and unemployment data for six Mon­
tana counties'will be deseasonalized and examined for devia­
tions from the long term trend. The correlation between em­
ployment and unemployment plus any lag/lead relationship 
will show how effective the employment market is in inform­
ing participants about job openings and the lack thereof.
In the perfect market the employer would advertise for 100 
employees at wage X, the going market rate, and with perfect 
information he would get exactly 100 perfectly qualified ap­
plicants. With lesser degrees of efficiency excess appli­
cants will apply and show up as an increase in unemployment 
and or a lagged relationship between employment rises and 
unemployment rises as unsuccessful applicants persist in job 
seeking in that area though all jobs are gone. The inverse 
is true for layoffs with early quits to take new jobs and an 
increasingly grim job picture driving the already unemployed 
out of the area to look for jobs elsewhere.
Summary
This chapter has shown that the theorists anticipate 
an inefficient market and has provided a workable definition 
of an efficient market in the sense of the employment mar­
ket. It has also outlined the tests which were undertaken 
to examine whether or not the employment market is efficient 
in six Montana counties. In the next chapter, the results 
of those tests are discussed and conclusions as to the ef­
ficiency of the employment market are drawn.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III 
FINDINGS 
Introduction
This chapter reviews the findings of the study, both 
qualitative and quantitative, and notes possible deficien­
cies in data or tests as measures of efficiency. It in­
cludes graphical reduction of the raw data and an analysis 
of those graphs. The raw data from which the graphs are ex­
tracted is attached in Appendixes I and II.
Qualitative Factors
The qualitative analysis comes from conversations and 
letters exchanged with personnel managers at the Anaconda 
Company, Montana Power, and Hoerner-Waldorf. Their impres­
sion is one of an inefficient market insofar as matching 
skills to jobs offered.
Comment by Mr. Jack Large of Hoerner-Waldorfi "every 
year we receive over 2000 job applications, both local and 
out-of-state...there seems to be no correlation between the 
need for additional people and the number of applications 
received." Additional commenti "hourly employees do not 
normally have the training they will need on the job and 
must be trained while on the job."
Quote from Mr. Loren Seaver of Montana Poweri "Col- 
strip employees are primarily local hires (85# from within 
120 miles) and most must be trained on the job; this is es-
16
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pecially true of minority hires (mostly Indians).**
Comment by Mr. Ralph Olson of the Anaconda Company 
vis-a-vis the closure of the zinc plant in Great Fallsi 
"Though it was known in advance that the plant would close 
and our work force declined from I600 to 750 over the course 
of 1961» there were very few voluntary quits and applica­
tions for jobs continued into July. There was no attempt 
to transfer workers to other Anaconda operations, though 
they would have a preference over a 'street hire' if they 
moved themselves."
These representative comments indicate an inefficient 
market in Missoula, Cascade, and Rosebud counties. Applica­
tions show no strong correlations with jobs, applicants show 
no good correlation with required job skills, and persons 
who know they will be out of work shortly cling to the bit­
ter end rather than seek new employment elsewhere. In short 
either the workers are not well informed or they do not be­
lieve their information.
Quantitative— Phillip's Curve Data
Background
The Phillip's curve data yields somewhat ambiguous 
results due in part to the limited data available. As is 
mentioned in chapter II the Phillip's curve predicts that 
high unemployment will put downward pressure on wage demands 
and depress wage increases. Conversely, if unemployment is 
low, workers have no qualms about making demands for in-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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creased wages, since they know that other jobs are easy to 
come by if their demands are not met. Both of these mecha­
nisms depend on the efficiency of the market since the work­
ers must possess the mobility to change jobs and information 
on the state of the job market when they formulate wage re­
quirements .
The coefficients of the curve can change with local­
ity, age, home ownership patterns, ethnic group, and indus­
try. The larger an area either geographic or demographic 
which is considered, the more stable the Phillip's curve re­
lation is. Consequently, one might expect the data for 
these counties to lie on similar curves, but there is no 
guarantee that they will. It is assumed that the demograph­
ics of the labor force in these counties is sufficiently 
constant during the short term of this study that the Phil­
lip's curve has not shifted.
Analysis
In Figure 1 the unemployment rate is plotted vs. ac­
tual dollar wage increases derived from mean income data 
for the counties. The individual lines are least squares 
lines for the data from individual counties while the curved 
line approximates the shape predicted by the Phillip’s 
curve. Only Rosebud county shows the proper slope and the 
aggregated data resembles a scattergun pattern which should 
imply an independence of unemployment and wage increases.
l^Rees, p. 234.
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This graph would indicate an inefficient market with workers 
asking for and getting wage increases in the face of in­
creasing unemployment.
Some theorists believe that the true variable in the
20relationship is real wages. Since this was a period of 
moderate inflation with Consumer Price Indices of 116.3 in 
1970, 121.3 in 1971, 125.3 in 197?-. and 133.1 in 1973, the 
Phillip's curve data is replotted in Figure 2 using constant 
1967 dollars. While this data is still not conclusive as to 
efficiency, both Cascade and Rosebud now exhibit downward 
slopes and a least squares curve would have a slope similar 
to the hypothetical Phillip's curve which is drawn on the 
graph. This graph implies efficiency, but only weakly since 
several counties still have positive slopes.
Quantitative Data— Employment vs. Unemployment
In an efficient market unemployment should be rela­
tively constant with net migration equalizing it between ad­
jacent regions. For purposes of labor markets, regions are 
adjacent so long as information flows freely between them 
and transfer costs between regions are limited. If unem­
ployment is related to employment, it should be an inverse 
relationship since if mobility is low the whole impact of 
changes in employment will be on the local area. Thus if 
employment rises the workers will come from the local pool
20Mark Jackson and E.B. Jones, "Unemployment and Oc­
cupational Wage Changes in Local Markets," Industrial and 
Labor Relations, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July, 1973), p. 1135.
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of unemployed and unemployment will fall; the converse holds 
when employment falls. To the extent that labor is mobile, 
and well informed, local unemployment will be stable no mat­
ter what local employment does.
The plots of employment and unemployment. Figures 
3-8, indicate a positive correlation and an inefficient mar­
ket, Further the simultaneous upswing of both seen regular­
ly in these figures indicates a poorly informed market with 
net in-migration despite rising unemployment. On the larger 
downswings the market seems to be more efficient with the 
inverse relation predominating. This might be expected 
since a worker who is laid-off or fired usually joins the 
unemployed ranks at least temporarily and the information 
content of being laid-off is relatively strong. A dramatic 
example of this is found in the ungraphed portion of the 
Cascade county data, see Appendix I; with the completion of 
the Minuteman construction the county lost 4000 jobs over a 
two year period but unemployment increased only slightly and 
did not persist past the end of the decline, since the un­
employed workers migrated out of the area.
Statistics Employed
Two tests are used to analyze the employment vs, un­
employment data. The first is the sign test which tests the 
hypothesis I This sample for county "A" comes from a popula­
tion "B" in which the employment market is efficient and em­
ployment and unemployment are not correlated; i,e., there
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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will be an equal number of positive and negative correla­
tions between the variables. A high sign test value would 
indicate that the sample comes from such a population "S'* 
in which the unemployment level is a random variable with 
respect to employment. A low value would indicate that the 
sample comes from a population "C" in which employment and 
unemployment are correlated and the employment market is in­
efficient. For the purposes of this paper any value above 
.8 will be considered high while those below .2 will be 
called low; between ,2 and ,8 will be treated as inconclu­
sive as to the efficiency of the employment market.
The second test is the one-sample runs test; it gives 
the expected range of numbers of runs in a sample given that 
successive observations are independent. Independence in 
this case means that your sampling technique was random and 
that the value observed at time t+1 did not depend on what 
was measured at time t. If the number of runs observed is 
either above or below the tabular range then it is likely 
that successive observations were not independent and your 
sample was not random. If the sample is random, it is, ce­
teris paribus, representative of the population.
These tests were chosen because they are especially
applicable to small sample sizes and neither makes any re-
21strictive assumptions about the underlying population.
21Sidney Seigel, Nonparametric Statistics for the 
Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1956), pp. 52-58 and 68-75.
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Likewise the same small sample makes most parametric statis­
tical tests quite weak due to the low confidence levels as­
sociated with limited samples. In each case the null hy­
pothesis— this sample represents a population characterized 
by an efficient market--will be accepted or rejected based 
on the .2 level of significance. Lower probability values 
which reject the null hypothesis will be analyzed vis-a-vis 
the efficient market hypothesis based on the probability 
value derived from the sign test.
Cascade County
The graph of unemployment vs. employment for Cascade 
county is seen in figure 3» It can be further analyzed by 
breaking it into a series of pluses and minuses by assigning 
a plus when the series move in consonance and a minus when 
they move in opposite directions; this sequence of pluses 
and minuses is amenable to testing by the sign test and the 
one-sample runs test described in the previous section. The 
runs test guards against a sampling bias while the sign test 
examines the null hypothesisi Hq I This sample represents 
a population in which the employment market is efficient.
For Cascade county the series includes 13 minuses,
23 pluses, and 23 runs; this gives a sign test value of .10 
and, therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. This low 
probability value is a strong rejection and indicates the 
converse is probably true; i.e., the employment market re­
presented by this sample is inefficient. The acceptable
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range for runs is from 11 to 24; thus 23 runs represents in­
dependent observations.
Considering only the upturns in the market the re­
sults are much the same; there are 7 minuses, 14 pluses, and 
12 runs. The sign test value is .095I therefore Hq must be 
rejected and the converse is strongly implied. The 12 runs
are well within the required range of 5 to 14 runs for inde­
pendent observations. On the downswings the series contains 
6 minuses, 9 pluses, and 7 runs. The null hypothesis is not 
rejected with a sign test value of .34, but this midrange 
value implies the converse only weakly. Again the 7 runs 
are well within the expected range of 4 to 13 runs and inde­
pendence is indicated. Overall the Cascade county market is
seen to be inefficient, though somewhat better efficiency is 
indicated on the downswings.
Flathead County
There is only one downswing seen in Figure 4, the 
Flathead data, thus only the aggregate and upswings will be 
tested. The aggregate series has 3 minuses, 8 pluses, and 
5 runs; while the upswing consists of 3» 7, and 5 respec­
tively. The runs test range is 2 to 9 runs in both cases, 
so both represent independent observations. Likewise the 
respective sign test probabilities are .11 and .17, both 
cases are less than .2 and Hq is rejected. The converse is 
very strongly implied; i.e., this sample represents a market 
which is not efficient. Thus an inefficient market is indi-
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cated for Flathead County.
Gallatin County
Gallatin too has testable data for only the upswing 
and aggregate series, see Figure 5. The aggregate series 
contains 5 minuses, 6 pluses, and 5 runs. This yields a
sign test value of .50 therefore, the null hypothesis will
not be rejected. The runs range of 3 to 10 implies inde­
pendence . This probability of .50 makes no implication to­
ward either inefficiency or efficiency. On the upswing 
there are 4 minuses, 6 pluses, and 5 runs for a sign test 
value of .38. Once more the runs are in the acceptable
range indicating independence and the null hypothesis is not
rejected. The .38 value is a mild implication of an ineffi­
cient market. The Gallatin county data is indeterminant as
to efficiency, though the null hypothesis is not rejected in 
either case.
Missoula and Rosebud Counties
These counties, seen in Figures 6 and 7» are identi­
cal on the upswing and differ by only one in the aggregate ; 
once more downswings are not testable. Both show 3 minuses 
and 7 pluses on the upswing with 5 runs for Missoula and 9
runs for Rosebud. The sign test yields .17 and a strong re­
jection of the null hypothesis* Hq * This sample represents 
a population characterized by an efficient market. This low 
probability implies the converse of the null hypothesis 
while independent observations are indicated with acceptable
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ranges of 3 to 10 runs for Missoula and 2 to 10 runs for 
Rosebud. In the aggregate series Rosebud has 3 pluses and 
8 minuses and Missoula has 4 pluses and 7 minuses; the runs 
data and allowable ranges are unchanged, preserving the in­
dependent observations. This yields sign test values of .11 
for Rosebud and .27 for Missoula with the null hypothesis 
rejected for Rosebud and not rejected for Missoula. Thus 
the converse is implied for Rosebud and weakly implied for 
Missoula. An inefficient market is implied in both cases, 
Pondera County
The aggregated data, see Figure 8, is identical to 
that found in Gallatin county as are the conclusions— the 
null hypothesis is rejected. On the downswings there are 3 
minuses, 2 pluses, and 3 runs ; this yields a sign test value 
of .83 and the solitary acceptance of the null hypothesis. 
The runs test can not be applied because of the small sam­
ple. On the upswing there are 2 minuses, 4 pluses, and 4 
runs; this gives a sign test value of .34 and Hq will not be
rejected with this midrange probability. The runs test can
not be applied due to small sample size. The Pondera mar­
ket appears to be efficient on the downswings but ineffi­
cient on upswings.
Aggregated Data
The aggregated data for all six counties for the 
years 1971-1973 are also tested as the reliability and sig­
nificance levels increase with increased data points. While
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the data is probably not combinable in the sense of being 
from the same population, if the market is efficient, its 
efficiency should not vary greatly over small geographic 
distances. The runs test is not applicable to the aggrega­
ted data since it consists of many separate samples. On the 
downswing 7 minuses and 6 pluses are found for a sign test 
value of .71. While this probability does not cause rejec­
tion of the null hypothesis, it shows a definite inclina­
tion toward efficiency. However, on the upswings the series 
contains 18 minuses and 36 pluses for sign test result of 
.01 and the strongest rejection of the null hypothesis 
found. This extremely low probability is a very strong in­
dication of inefficiency on the upswing. With upswings and 
downswings combined there are 25 minuses and 42 pluses for 
a sign test value of .02 and another strong rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Again an inefficient market is implied.
Summary
This chapter contains a description of the statisti­
cal test used to analyze the county data; it also summarizes 
the results of those tests for each county and in the aggre­
gate. It should be noted that the .2 value uses as an ac­
ceptance criteria is extremely liberal with .1 or lower 
being the popular level of significance. Even with this 
liberal value ten rejections, six inconclusive results, and 
only one acceptance of the null hypothesis were found in 
seventeen trials. In the final chapter these findings form
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the basis for the conclusions and implications of this stud-
y*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
This study has shown mixed results with respect to 
the efficiency of the labor market. The qualitative test 
says that the market is inefficient with a poor matching of 
jobs offered and jobs sought. There is also a reluctance to 
believe bad news in the market. The Phillip's curve indi­
cates an inefficient market at first glance, but when the 
pressures of inflation are removed from the data the results 
are less certain. Some counties appear efficient while 
others appear inefficient; the aggregated data indicates at 
least partial efficiency based on the Phillip's curve. 
Lastly, the employment vs. unemployment relationship shows 
inefficiency on the upswings of employment but efficiency on 
the downswings. This is not unexpected since on the down­
swings the new lay-offs have little choice but to join the 
ranks of the unemployed temporarily.
The overall conclusion must be that the market is in­
efficient, though it may have efficient segments. In parti­
cular the Phillip's curve data are the strongest indication 
of an efficient market, which could suggest that employers 
are more aware of market conditions, i.e., wage pressures, 
than laborers are. This possibility is supported by the ex­
cessive response by the labor force to upward changes in the
36
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available jobs.
Implications
An inefficient market has implications for all par- 
ties to the employment marketj laborers, employers, and 
employment agencies. To the employee it means he can im­
prove his own job opportunities through higher mobility— a 
lower reluctance to move— and by increasing his information 
search to include geographic areas outside his immediate vi­
cinity. It also means he may be able to obtain a job for 
which he is not fully qualified because better qualified ap­
plicants may not be aware of the opportunity.
The U.S. employment agency has the mission of facil­
itating the employment process, which can be accomplished by 
increasing market efficiency. This study would indicate 
that information on the limits of employment opportunities 
as well as on the precise job requirements would be useful. 
For private employment agencies the information on the pre­
cise nature of the jobs on one hand and the qualifications 
of the applicants on the other would insure a better fit and 
increase the likelihood that firms would use their servi-
Lastly for the employer it means that he can obtain 
better employees at the same wage by increasing information 
outflow both in the geographic sense and in the level of in­
formation diseminated. The same result can be accomplished
22Wall Street Journal. April 27, 1972, p. 1.
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by lowering transfer costs to the prospective worker to fa­
cilitate their moving into the area where the jobs are lo­
cated.
Suggested Further Investigation 
Further investigation into the Phillip's curve data 
to ascertain the nature of the employment information flow 
for Montana is warranted to provide a baseline of informa­
tion for future studies. As the available data increases 
over time the precise shape of the curve can be determined 
and a better statistical assessment made.
A second suggested study is to survey the information 
flow from the employer's side. How do they go about obtain­
ing employees? What sorts of matches and mismatches occur 
as a result of present practices and how can the information 
be improved to obtain a more satisfactory fit? This study 
could include the function of private and public employment 
agencies as dispersera of information.
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Mav 1974 GREAT FAILS SflSA (Cascade Ooum)
Historical Series 
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
in Thoueanda
RESIDENCE DATA
Date
Civilian EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT LaborManage­Labor
Force Total Non-Ag Agri. Total Percent^ mentCounty State Dispute
1973
January 30.2 27.5 26.5 1.0 2.7 8.8 8.6 *
February 30.4 27.9 26.6 1.3 2.5 8.3 7.9 *
March 30.7 28.4 27.2 1.2 2.3 7.4 7.4 *
April 31.8 29.7 28.0 1.7 2.1 6.7 6.3 *
May 32.2 30.0 28.4 1.6 2.2 6.9 5.6 *
June 34.2 31.2 29.3 1.9 3.0 8.8 7.0 0
July 34.1 31.7 29.2 2.5 2.4 7.0 5.8 0
August 34.4 32.4 29.3 3.1 2.0 5.9 5.1 0
September 33.0 31.0 29.2 1.8 2.0 6.2 4.8 *
October 32.0 30.3 28.9 1.4 1.7 5.4 4.9 0
November 31.4 29.4 28.3 1.1 2.0 6.3 6.5 *
December 31.4 29.5 28.1 1.4 1.9 6.0 6.5 *
1973 Avg. 32.1 29.9 28.2 1.7 2.2 6.8 6.3 *
January
ebruary
March
April
May
June
July
lugust
September
Ictober
lovember
December
Avg.
anuary 
ebruary 
terch 
pril .
lune
uly
ugust
eptember
ctober
lovember
lecember
Avg.
Computed from whole (unrounded) numbers. * Under 50.
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I February 1974 GREAT County) RESIDENCE DATA
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
in Thousands
Date
Civilian
Labor
Force
EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT LaborManage­
Total Non-Ag Agri. Total Percent a ment
Countv State Dispute
1 1970
January 27.5 25.9 24.4 1.5 1.6 5.8 6.3 0
February 27.8 26.1 24.6 1.5 f.7 6.0 6.8 0
March 28.3 26.7 25.2 1.5 1.6 5.7 7.1 0
April 28.3 26.8 25.3 1.5 1.5 5.3 5.5 0
May 28.6 27.0 25.8 1.2 1.6 5.5 5.1 0
June 30.4 28.7 27.2 1.5 1.7 5.6 5.6 0
July 30.1 28.5 26.8 1.6 1.6 5.2 4.7 *
August 30.3 29.0 27.2 1.8 1.3 4.4 4.3 *1
September 30.2 28.9 27.1 1.8 1.3 4.2 4.5 .1
October 29.2 28.0 27.1 .9 1.2 4.0 3.9 .1
November 29.4 28.0 26.9 1.1 1.4 4.6 5.2 *
December 29.2 27.9 1.3 _ 1.3 __±J5 .. A n *
1970 Avg. 29.1 27.6 26.1 1.5 1.5 5.2 5.4 *
i m
January 29.1 27.1 25.5 1.6 2.0 6.8 7.8 0
February 29.1 27.1 25.8 1.3 2.0 6.7 7.8 0
March 29.4 27.6 26.1 1.5 1.8 6.2 7.8 0
April 30.5 28.8 26.7 2.1 1.7 5.5 6.3 0
May 30.8 29.2 27.2 2.0 1.6 5.1 5.3 0
June 32.3 30.2 27.6 2.6 2.1 6.4 6.5 .1
July 31.3 29.4 27.5 1.9 1.9 6.1 5.7 1.4
August 31.6 29.7 27.5 2.2 1.9 5.9 5.5 1.4
September 31.2 29.4 27.6 1.8 1.8 5.7 5.4 1.4
October 30.1 28.7 27.4 1.3 1.4 4.5 4.8 0
November 30.0 28.5 27.3 1.2 1.5 5.1 6.1 0
December 29.8 28.2 27.1 1.1 1.6 a. A 6.a 0
1971 Avg. 30.5 28.7 27.0 1.7 1.8 5.9 6.3 .4
1972
January 29.4 27.4 26.5 .9 2.0 7.0 8.1 0
February 29.5 27.5 26.6 .9 2.0 6.9 8.1 0
larch 30.2 28.4 27.1 1.3 1.8 5.9 7.7 0
Ipri 1 31.3 29.7 27.9 1.8 1.6 5.2 • 6.3 0 .
f lay 31.2 29.7 28.3 1.4 1.5 4.8 5.4 0
lune 33.4 30.9 29.0 1.9 2.5 7.5 6.3 0
i= luly 32.6 30.4 28.7 1.7 2.2 6.7 5.4 *
; ugust 32.6 30.5 28.2 2.3 2.1 6.6 5.2 *
)eptember 32.3 30.3 28.1 2.2 2.0 6.3 4.7 *
; ttober 31.1 29.2 27.7 1.5 1.9 6.1 4.7 0
ovember 31.1 28.9 27.6 1.3 2.2 7.0 6.0 *
ecember 31.1 28.7 27.6 1.1 2.4 7.6 7.1 *
972 Avg. -----I L 3 ---- ----2@JL_ . 2.7_a_ ... 1.5. .... . 2.0 6.5 6.0 *
'omputed from whole {unrounded) numbers * Under 50 Series began January 1970
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July 12. 1973 GREAT FALLS SflSA (Cascade County)
civilian Work Force
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
in ThoueandB .
■ Date
"  " ■■■
Civilian
Work
Force
■ ----
EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT LaborManage­
Total Non-Ag Agri. Total Percent^ mentCounty State 1 Dispute
1968
January 28.3 25.6 24.3 1.3 1.9 6.7 6.2 .8
February 28.2 25.7 24.5 1.2 1.7 6.0 6.3 .8
March 29.0 26.7 25.2 1.5 1.5 5.2 5.6 .8
April 29.6 28.3 26.8 1.5 1.3 4.4 5.3 *
May 29.9 28.6 27.3 1.3 1.2 4.0 4.4 .1
June 31.7 30.0 28.4 1.6 1.7 5.4 5.4 *
July 31.5 30.2 28.5 1.7 1.3 4.1 4.2 *
August 31.2 30.0 28.5 1.5 1.2 3.8 3.7 *
September 30.1 29.0 28.0 1.0 1.1 3.7 3.4 *
October 29.8 28.7 27.5 1.2 1.1 3.7 3.4 *
November 30.0 28.7 27.4 1.3 1.3 4.3 4.7 *
December 29.6 28.3 27.1 1.2 1.3 4.4 4.4 *
1968 Avg. 29.9 28.3 26.9 1.4 1.4 4.7 4.7 .2
1969
January 28.3 26.8 25.9 .9 1.5 5.3 6.7 *
February 28.5 27.0 26.1 .9 1.5 5.3 6.9 0
March 28.9 27.4 26.4 1.0 1.5 5.2 7.0 0
April 30.0 28.6 27.3 1.3 1.4 4.7 5.9 0
May 30.9 29.5 28.0 1.5 1.4 4.5 5.0 0
June 31.9 30.2 28.7 1.5 1.7 5.3 6.1 0
July 31.5 30.2 28.7 1.5 1.3 4.1 4.9 0
August 31.6 30.4 29.0 1.4 1.2 3.8 4.7 0
September 30.9 29.8 28.8 1.0 1.1 3.6 4.3 0
October 30.0 28.9 27.7 1.2 1.1 3.7 4.4 0
November 30.3 28.9 27.6 1.3 1.4 4.6 5.8 0
December 29.8 28.5 27.3 1.2 1.3 4.4 5.9 0
1969 Avg. 30.2 28.8 27.6 1.2 1.4 4.6 5.6 *
NOTICE OF SERIES CHANGE
January 1974. the Montana Employment Security Division adjusted its Civilian Labor Force 
les to reflect a count of persons employed and unemployed by place of residence (known as 
1 i  father than by place of work (known as establishment data). The years 1970,
1 '.2% wsre revised to reflect the residence concept and as a result data prior
January 1970 are not strictly comparable to data published after January 1970.
:eptually, the difference between the old and new series Is that residence data eliminate 
tons holding more than one job (dual job holders), and persons who work in Montana but 
. out-of-state are removed and persons who live in Montana but work elsewhere are added.
conversion from an establishment to a residence basis was requested by the U.S. Department 
■abor of all State Employment Security Agencies to ensure comparability between states and 
lake employment data published for Montana comparable to national labor force concepts.
Under SO
Computed from whole (unrounded) numbers.
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,5., B.L.S.
I Date
r
Civilian Work Force
in Thouaande
Civilian
Work
E M P L 0 Y M E N T LaborManage­
ment
DisputeForce Total Non-Agri,. Agri.
UNEMPLOYMENT
Total Co.
Paroent 
I State
1965
ianuary 27.8 26.0 24.4 1.6 0 1.8 6.5 6. 5
lebruary 27.9 26.0 24.6 1.4 0 1.9 6.8 7.4
larch 28.0 26.3 25.0 1.3 0 1.7 6.1 6. 9
Ipril 29.5 28.1 26.7 1.4 0 1.4 4. 7 6. 0
fay 29.9 28.6 27.4 1.2 0 1.3 4.3 4.9tune 30.9 29.4 27.7 1.7 0 1.5 4.9 5.4
luly 30.7 29.5 27.9 1.6 0 1.2 3. 9 4. 1
lugust 30.7 29.6 28.1 1.5 0 1.1 3. 6 3.6
lept ember 30.6 29.5  ̂ 28.2 1.3 0 1.1 3. 6 3. 7
Ictober 30.6 29.5 28.1 1.4 0 1.1 3. 6 3. 0
lovember 31.3 29.6 27.9 1.7 0 1.7 6.4 4.8
lecember 29.7 28.4 26.9 1.5 0 1.3 4. 4 4. 6
|verage : 29.8 28.4 26.9 1.5 0 1.4 4. ? 5. 0
1 1966
January 28.8 27.2 25.6 1.6 0 1.6 5. 6 6. 0
lebruary 28.7 27.0 25.8 1.2 0 1.7 5.9 6.8
larch 28.5 27.1 26.0 1.1 0 1.4 4.9 6. 5
Ipril 29.0 27.8 26.4 1.4 0 1.2 4. 1 4. 5
•ay 30.0 28.9 27.5 1.4 0 1.1 3. ? 4. 2
lune 31.6 30.2 28.4 1.8 0 1.4 4. 4 4. 9
luly 31.4 30.2 28.7 1.5 * 1.2 3. 8 3. 7
lugust 31.5 30.5 29.0 1.5 •k 1.0 3. 2 3.4
ieptember 31.3 30.3 28.9 1.4 0 1.0 3. 2 3. 3
ictober 30.6 29.5 28.1 1.4 0 1.1 3. 6 3. 5
lovember 31.3 29.6 27.9 1.7 0 1.7 5.4 5. 4
lecember 31.1 29.6 27.9 1.7 0 1.5 4. 8 5.1
average : 30.3 29.0 27.5 1.5 * 1.3 4. 3 4. 7
1967
anuary 29.8 28.1 26.6 1.5 0 1.7 5. 7 5. 8
ebruary 29.7 27.9 26.4 1.5 0 1.8 6.1 6. 2
larch 30.7 28.7 26.5 2.2 0 2.0 6. 5 6.1
pril 30.0 28.4 27.0 1.4 0 1.6 S. 3 5. 2
ay 30.7 28.9 27.1 1.8 .1 1.7 5.5 5. 0
une 31.3 29.4 27.7 1.7 0 1.9 6.1 5.2
uly 32.2 30.5 28.2 2.3 0 1.7 5. 3 4. 4
ugust 31.8 29.2 26.7 2.5 1.3 1.3 4.1 3. 6
ieptember 30.4 28.2 26.5 1.7 1.2 1.0 3. 3 3. 4
Ictober 30.5 28.4 26.8 1.6 1.0 1.1 3. 6 3. 3
ovember 30.6 28.3 26.6 1.7 .9 1.4 4. 6 4. 4
lecember 30.6 28.2 26.1 2.1 .8 1.6 5. 2 5. 0
verage: 30.7 28.7 26.9 1.8 .4 1.6 5.2 4. 8
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B t D m S t 
itena, Montana
Civilian Work Force
in Thouaande
1
Date
Civilian
Work
B M P L 0 Y M B N T LaborManage­
ment
Dispute
UNEMPLOYMENT
Force Total Non-Agri# Agri. Total PercentCo. State
1 1962 
Anuary 29.6 27.6 26.1 1.5 0 2.0 6.8 8.3
Ibruary 29.8 27.9 26.6 1.3 0 1.9 6. 4 8.5
irch 30.1 28.1 26.8 1.3 0 2.0 6. 6 8.2
iril 31.1 29.7 28.1 1.6 0 : 1.4 4.5 6. 5
31.7 30.5 29.0 1.5 0 1.2 3. 8 4.9
me 32.9 31.5 29.8 1.7 0 1.4 4.3 5.1
ily 33.1 32.0 30.4 1.6 0 1.1 3.3. 4. 2
igust 33.5 32.5 31.0 1.5 0 1.0 3. 0 3. 9
iptember 33.1 32.1 30.6 1.5 0 1.0 3. 0 3. 6
:tober 32.9 3 U 7 30.4 1.3 0 1.2 3. 6 3. 5
IV ember 33.3 31.8 ' 30.4 1.4 0 1.5 4.5 4.5
member 32.8 31.4 30.1 1.3 0 1.4 4.3 5.2
frerage :
i
32.0 30.6 29.1 1.5 0 1.4 4.4 5.5
j 1963I
inuary 32.5 30.6 29.0 1.6 0 1.9 5. 8 6. 8
ibruary 32.3 30.5 29.1 1.4 0 1.8 5 . 6 7. 6
irch 32.1 30.5 29.1 1.4 0 1.6 5. 0 7. 0
iril 32.2 30.7 29.1 1.6 0 1.5 4. 7 6. 3
ly 32.0 30.6 29.0 1.6 0 1.4 4.4 5.0
me 32.3 30.6 28.8 1.8 0 1.7 5.3 5.4
ily 32.0 30.4 28.5 1.9 0 1.6 5.0 4.5
igust 31.4 29.9 28.0 1.9 0 1.5 4.8 4. 0
iptember 30.7 29.3 27.8 1.5 * 1.4 4. 6 3. 5
:tober 29.6 28.3 26.7 1.6 0 1.3 4. 4 3.5
>v ember 29.2 27.6 26.1 1.5 0 1.6 5. 5 5. 1
icember 29.4 27.4 25.8 1.6 0 2.0 6. 8 6.1
|ferage :
L.
31.3 29.7 28.1 1.6 * 1.6 5. 2 5.4
1 1964
muary 28.4 26.2 24.6 1.6 0 2.2 7. 7 7. 0
ibruary 28.2 26.1 24.7 1.4 0 2.1 7.4 7. 4
irch 28.4 26.2 24.6 1.6 0 2.2 7. 7 7. 3
)ril 28.7 27.0 25.2 1.8 0 1.7 S. 9 6. 0
ly 29.2 27.6 26.0 1.6 0 1.6 5 . 5 6. 1me 29.7 28.0 26.4 1.6 * 1.7 5. 7 5. 7
Ily 30. 2 28.8 27.2 1.6 0 1.4 4.6 4. 2
igust 30.0 28.8 27.3 1.5 0 1.2 4. 0 3. 7
iptember 29.3 28. 2 27.0 1.2 0 1.1 3. 8 3. 4
ztober 29.1 28.0 26.6 1.4 0 1.1 3. 8 3. 6
ivember 29.3 27.9 26.4 1.5 0 1.4 4. 8 4. 9
ic ember 28.9 27.2 25.6 1.6 0 1.7 5. 9 5. 6
ferage:
i
29.1 27.5 26.0 1.5 * 1.6 5. 5 5.3
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I July 1974 FLATicAD mm
HISTORICAL SERIES 
NOT SEASONALLÏ ADJUSTED
Date
Civilian
Labor
Force
EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT 1 Labor 1 Manage-
Total Non-Ag Agri. Total Percent^ 1 mentCounty State 1 Disputed
1971 •
January 14,080 12.280 11,860 420 1,800 12.8 7.8 0
February 14,200 12,400 11,960 440 1,800 12.7 7.8 0
March 14,440 12,620 12,130 490 1,820 12.6 7.8 0
Aprl 1 14,560 12,800 12,180 620 1,760 12.1 6.3 0
May 14,500 13,210 12,620 590 1,290 8.9 5.3 0
June 15,410 14,050 13,370 680 1,360 8.8 6.5 0
July 15,430 14,430 13,700 730 1,000 6.S 5.5 0
August 15,560 14,640 13,930 710 920 8.9 6.4 0
September 14,940 14,020 13,520. 500 920 6.2 5.3 0
October 14,320 13,580 13,080 500 740 5.2 4.8 0
November 14,480 13,550 13,000 550 930 6.4 6.1 0
December 14,820 13,460 12,920 540 1,360 9.2 6.9 0
1971 Avg. 14,730 13,420 12,860 560 1,310 8.9 6.3 0
1972
January 14,500 13,010 12,540 470 1,490 10.S 8.1 0
February 14,750 13,140 12,630 510 1,610 10.9 8.1 0
March 15,090 13,370 12,850 520 1,720 11.4 7.7 0
April 15,440 13,830 13,210 620 1,610 10.4 6.3 0
May 15,670 14,310 13,630 680 1,360 8.6 5.4 140
June 16,820 15,380 14,540 840 1,440 8.6 6.3 0
July 17,030 15,810 15,010 800 1,220 7.2 5.4 0
August 17,300 16,150 15,110 1,040 1,150 6.6 5.2 0
September 16,560 15,550 14,830 720 1,010 6.1 4.7 0
October 15,740 14,800 14,320 480 940 6.0 4.7 0
November 16,020 14,810 14,220 590 1,210 7.S 6.0 0
December 16,180 14,660 14,150 510 1,520 9.4 7.2 0
1972 Avg. 15,930 14,570 13,920 650 1,360 8.5 6.2 10
1973
January 15,980 14,190 13,840 350 1,790 11.2 8.6 0
February 15,900 14,270 13,860 410 1,630 JO.J 7.9- 0
March 16,340 14,670 14,210 460 1,670 1C.2 7.4 0
April 16,270 14,790 14,240 550 1,480 9.1 6.3 0
May 16,860 15,410 14,880 530 ■ 1,450 8.6 5.6 0
June 18,150 16,440 15,780 660 1,710 9.4 7.0 0
July 18.210 16,880 16,020 860 1,330 7 .3 5.8 0
August 18,440 17,050 16,150 900 1,390 7.5 5.1 0
September 17,950 16,750 15,790 960 1,200 6.7 4.8 0
October 17,170 16,030 15,300 730 1,140 6.7 4.9 0
November 17,400 15,880 15,220 660 1,520 8.8 6.5 0
December 17,480 15,720 15,100 620 1,760 10.1 6.5 97
1973 Avg. 17,180 15,670 15,030 640 1,510 8.8 6.3 8
Computed from whole (unrounded) numbers.
1/ Non-Additive -  Inaluded in Total Employment.
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June 1974 64UATIM COUNTY
HISTORICAL SERIES 
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED
Date
Civilian
Labor
Force Total
EMPLOYMENT
Non-Ag Agri. Total
.. ..
UNEMPLOYMENT
Percent
Labor
Manage­
ment
iCounty State Dispute
1971
iJanuary 12,420 11,850 10,880 970 570 4.6 7.8 0
F̂ebruary 12,510 11,940 10,960 980 570 4.6 7.8 0
flarch 12,790 12,230 11,150 1,080 560 4.3 7.8 0
$pril 13,170 12,610 11,300 1,310 560 4.2 6.3 0
lav 13,540 13,090 11,810 1,280 450 3.3 5.3 0June 14,670 14,090 12,690 1,400 580 4.0 6.5 0
iJuly 14,620 14,180”̂ 12,740 1,440 440 3.0 5.5 0
Iftuqust 14,770 14,340 12,880 1,460 430 2.9 5.4 0
September 13,790 13,430 12,440 990 360 2.6 5.3 0
October 13,810 13,390 12,390 1,000 420 3.0 4.8 0
N̂ovember 13,860 13,340 12,180 1,160 520 3.7 6.1 0
D̂ecember 13.900 13,360 12,180 _ lil80 _ 540 3.9 6.9 0
%971 Avg. 13,660 13,160 11,970 1,19.0 500 2.7 6.3 0
' 1321 
jJanuary 13,870 13,240 12,310 930 630 4.6 8.1 0
February 13,950 13,260 12,330 930 690 4.9 8.1 M r
llarch 14,520 13,920 12,690 1,230 600 4.1 7.7 M r
;pri1 15,060 14,490 12,950 1,540 570 3.8 6.3 M r
{May 15,620 15,060 13,380 1,680 560 3.6 5.4 0
|June 17,010 16,360 14,320 2,040 650 3.8 6.3 0
|k1y 15,970 15,400 14,020 1,380 570 3.6 5.4 0
;August
September
October
16,330 15,780 14,030 1,750 550 3.4 5.2 015,460 15,000 13,780 1,220 460 3.0 4.7 015,030 14,540 13,600 940 490 3.2 4.7 0
November 15,220 14,680 13,560 1,120 540 3.6 6.0 0
D̂ecember 15,390 14,720 13,600 1,120 670 4.4 7.1 0
|l972 Avg. 15,280 14,700 13,380 1,320 580 3.8 6.2 M r
1 1973 
January 14,980 14,170 13,510 660 sTo' 1.4 8.6 0
iFebruarv
ârch
15,170 14,480 13,720 760 690 4.6 7.9 0
15,790 15,050 14,060 890 740 4.7 " 7.4 0
p̂ril 16,040 15,290 13,930 1,360 750 4.7 6.3 0
pay 16,520 15,850 14,590 1,260 670 4.1 5.6 0June 17,770 16,820 15,370 1,450 950 5.4 7.0 0
July 17,420 16,650 15,220 1,430 770 4.4 5.8 0
|\ugust 17,970 17,310 15,460 1,850 660 3.6 5.1 loo
September 17,190 16,600 15,080 1,520 590 3.4 4.8 100
October 16,580 16,090 15,030 1,060 490 3.0 4.9 100
Ijovember 16,440 15,660 14,810 850 780 4.8 6.5 0
December 16,210 15,590 14,770 820 620 3.8 6.5 0
|1973 Avg. 16,510 15,800 14,630 1,170 710 4.3 6.3 **
«Computed from whole (unrounded) nund>ere 
** Less then 50 strikers
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juiy i%/4 MibbUULA UJUNIY
HISTORICAL SERIES
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED
Civilian
Labor
Force
EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT LaborManage­
mentD@tG Total Non-Ag Agri. Total PeroentiCounty State Dispute
1971
January 21,980 20,470 20,150 320 1,510 6.9 7.8 0
j February 22,030 20,490 20,170 320 1,540 7.0 7.8 0
V March 22,720 21,310 20,960 350 1,410 6.2 7.8 0
; April 23,110 21,790 21,380 410 1,320 5.7 6.3 0
May 23,390 22,260 21,900 360 1,130 4.8 5.3 0
1 June 24,510 23,130 22,710 420 1,380 5.6 6.5 0
J July 24,780 23,610 23,190 420 1,170 4.7 S.5 0
’ August 24,810 23,780 23,380 400 1,030 4.2 5.4 0
» September 24,600 23,600 23,290 310 1,000 4.0 5.3 0
JOctober 24,470 23,580 23,260 320 890 3.6 4.8 0
- November 24,360 23,240 22,880 360 1,120 4.6 6.1 0
December 24.190 22.960 22.600 360 1.230 5.1 6.9 0
1971 Avg. 23,750 22.520 22.160 360 1,230 5.2 6.3 0
1972 
: January 23,900 22,530 22,210 320 1,370 5.7 8.1 *
\February 24,030 22,520 22,180 340 1.510 6.3 8.1 *
f March 24,490 23,080 22,720 360 1,410 5.8 7.7 *
1 April 25,160 23,950 23,520 430 1.210 4.8 6.3 *
May 25,920 24,730 24.240 490 1,190 4.6 5.4 *
1 June 26,950 25,540 24,950 590 1,410 5.2 6.3 *
1 July 25,850 24,390 23,830 560 1,460 5.6 5.4 *
jAugust 26,480 25,030 24,280 750 1,450 5.5 5.2 *
1 September 26,100 24.800 24.310 490 1,300 5.0 4.7 *
\October 25,820 24,630 24,300 330 1,190 4.6 4.7 *
; November 25,810 24,390 24,010 380 1,420 5.5 6.0 *
i December 25.500 23,880 23,540 340 1,620 6.3 7.1 *
Î1972 Avg. 25,480 24,100 23,650 450 1,380 5.4 6.2 *
 ̂ 1973
^January 25,180 23,410 23,170 240 1.770 7.0 8.6 *
'February 25,430 23,690 23,410 280 1,740 6.8 7.9 *
iMarch 26,090 24,320 24,000 320 1,770 6.8 7.4 *
lAprll 26,310 24,690 24,310 380 1.620 6.2 6.3 ♦
iMay 27,070 25,590 25,220 370 1,480 5.5 5.6 *
[June 28,220 26,350 25,890 460 1.870 6.6 7.0 *
jJuly 28,080 26,440 25,850 590 1,640 5.9 5.8 *
’August 27,620 26,220 25,590 630 1,400 5.1 5.1 *
^September 28,030 26,400 25,740 660 1,630 5.8 4.8 *
iOctober 27,660 26,230 25,720 510 1,430 5.2 4.9 *
{November 27.730 25,920 25,460 460 1,810 6.5 6.5 *
December 27,390 25,760 25,330 430 1,630 6.0 6.5 *
;1973 Avg. 27,070 25,420 24,980 440 1,650 6.1 6.3 *
I# Computed from whole (unrounded) numbers, 
M Less than 10 Strikers.
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July 1974 pomk œiwiY
HISTORICAL SERIES 
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED
Date
Civilian
Labor
Force
EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT LaborMàhatfe-
mentTotal Non-Ag Agri. Total Percent*County State Dispute
1971
January 2,530 2,320 1,790 530 210 • 8.4 7.8 0
February 2,410 2,230 1,750 480 180 7.6 7.8 0
March 2,530 2,340 1,830 510 190 7.6 7.8 0
April 2,950 2,750 1,940 810 200 6.8 6.3 0
May 3,040 2,800 1,970 830 240 8.0 5.3 0
June 3,400 3,150 , 2,040 1,110 250 7.3 6.5 0
July 3,350 3,110 ' 2,010 1,100 240 7.2 5.5 0
August 3,380 3,210 1,980 1,230 170 S.l 5.4 0
September 2,790 2,670 1,960 710 120 4.3 5.3 0
October 2,660 2,550 1,900 650 110 4.2 4.8 0
November 2,720 2,560 1,870 690 160 6.0 6.2 0
December 2,730 2,500 1,880 620 230 8.4 6.9 0
1971 Avg. 2,870 2,680 1,910 770 190 6.6 6.3 0
1972
January 2,560 2,320 1,850 470 240 9.3 8.1 0
February 2,810 2,560 2,060 500 250 8.9 8.1 0
March 2,790 2,590 2,000 590 200 7.2 7.7 0
April 3,440 3,310 2,510 800 130 3.8 6.3 0
May 3,860 3,710 2,870 840 150 3.8 5.4 0
June 3,510 3,220 2,190 1,030 290 8.4 6.3 0
July 3,210 3,000 2,040 960 210 6.4 5.4 0
August 3,160 2,990 2,060 930 170 S.3 5.2 0
September 2,830 2,660 1,980 680 170 S.9 4.7 0
October 2,730 1 2,590 1,970 620 140 5.2 4.7 0
November 2,650 2,490 1,930 560 160 6.2 6.0 0
December 2,700 2,470 1,950 520 230 8.5 7.1 0
1972 Avg. 3,030 2,830 2,120 710 200 6.6 6.2 0
1973
January 2,790 2,510 1,910 600 280 9.8 8.6 0
February 2,830 2,560 1,930 630 270 9.6 7.9 0
March 3,070 2,830 2,020 810 240 7.8 7.4 0
April 3,200 3,000 2,000 1,000 200 6.3 6.3 0
May 3,340 3,140 2,040 1,100 200 6.0 5.6 0
June 3,500 3,250 2,070 1,180 250 7.1 7.0 0
July 3,520 3,340 2,000 1,340 180 5.2 5.8 0
August 3,830 3,640 1,970 1,670 190 4.9 5*1 0
September 3,710 3,560 1,940 1,620 150 4.2 4.8 0
October 3,320 3,130 1,890 1,240 190 S»7 4.9 0
November 3,090 2^900 1,870 1,030 190 6.1 6.5 0
December 2.770 2,590 1,850 740 180 6.4 6.5 0
1973 Avg. 3,250 3,040 1,960 1,080 210 6.5 6.3 0
Computed from whole (unrounded) mati>ere.
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nUÙCDUU UUYIT
HISTORICAL SERIES 
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED
Date
Civilian
Labor
Force
EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT LaborManage­
ment
DisputeTotal Non-Ag Agri. Total
Peroent*
County State
1971
January 2,320 2,170 1,730 440 150 6.4 7.8 0
February 2,310 2,160 1,730 430 150 6.6 7.8 0
March 2,440 2,300 1,760 540 140 S.9 7.8 0
April 2,460 2,380 1,800 580 80 S.4 6.3 0
May 2,540 2,450 1.840 . 610 90 3.7 5.3 0
June 2.710 2,600 1,900 ' 700 110 4.0 6.5 0
July 2,940 2,820 1,940 880 120 4.2 5.5 0
August 2,780 2,690 1,920 770 90 3.1 5.4 0
September 2,460 2.410 1,910 500 50 2.1 5.3 0
October 2,540 2,470 1,970 500 70 2.8 4.8 0
November 2,490 2,400 1,920 480 90 3.5 6.1 0
December 2,480 2.400 1.890 510 80 3.3 6.9 0
1971 Avg. 2,540 2,440 1,860 580 100 4.1 6.3 0
1972
January 2,430 2,330 1,900 430 100 4.2 8.1 0
February 2,490 2,350 1,870 480 140 5.6 8.1 0
larch 2,590 2,480 1,950 530 110 4.1 7.7 0
April 2,830 2,740 2,040 700 90 3.2 6.3 0
May 2,870 2,770 2,050 720 100 3.6 5.4 0
June 3,100 2,960 2,120 840 140 4.6 6.3 0
July 3,050 2,940 2,080 860 110 3.7 5.4 0
August 2,970 2,850 2,050 800 120 3.9 5.2 0
September 2,630 2,530 2,000 530 100 3.6 4.7 0
October 2,570 2,480 1,930 550 90 5.4 4.7 0
November 2,690 2,540 2,000 540 150 5.4 6.0 0
December 2.590 2.450 1.930 520 140 4.2 7.1 0
1972 Avg. 2,730 2,610 1,990 620 120 4.2 6.2 0
1973
January 2,620 2.480 2,100 380 140 5.4 8.6 0
February 2.730 2,590 2,110 480 140 5.0 7.9 0
March 2,940 2,800 2,170 630 140 4.7 7.4 0
April 3,080 2,970 2,330 640 110 3.4 6.3 Ô
May 3,050 2,940 2,340 600 110 3.6 5.6 0
June 3,530 3,330 2,660 670 200 5.7 7.0 Q
July 3,250 3,100 2,430 670 150 4.6 5.8 0
August 3,280 3,140 2,360 780 140 4.2 5.1 0
September 3,290 3,190 2,430 760 100 3.0 4.8 0
October 3,630 3,550 2,940 610 80 2.3 4.9 0
November 3,480 3,350 2,830 520 130 3.7 6.5 0
December 3,270 3,200 2,820 380 70 2.0 6.5 0
1973 Avg. 3,180 3,060 2,460 600 120 3.9 6.3 0
'* Computed fpom whole (unbounded) numbeps.
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APPENDIX II 
Mean Income Data
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Cascade County 
Employment 
Income(1000) 
Income
1967
33,758
1968
34,185262.5
1969
34,673283.921.4
1970
34,929
1971 1972 
35,279 36,234325.6 358.4
15.3 32.8
Flathead County 
Employment 
Income(1000) 
Income
14,522
>
14,889116.2
14,504
114.7
-1.5
14,475122.98.2
15,018
131.4
7.5
15,713145.1
13.7
Gallatin County 
Employment 
Income(1000) 
Income
11,338 11,55878.8 11,66390.812.0
12,172
102.7
11.9
12,606
106.74.0
13,496
122.6
15.9
Missoula County 
Employment Income(1000) 
Income
21,412 21,925
164.5
22,920
178.2
13.7
23,065
194.716.5
23,771212.3
15.6
24,991
235.523.2
Pondera County 
Employment 
Income(1000) 
Income
2,719 2,63922.6 2,45424,2
1.6
2,726
30.8
6.6
2,75326.5
-4.3
2,749
33.57.0
Rosebud County 
Employment 
Income(1000) 
Income
2,569 2,544
15.5
2,504
17.4
1.9
2,550
19.1
1.7
2,782
21.1
2.0
2,90924.2
3.1
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